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Lightning Rods, Earthquakes, and Regional Identities:
Towards a Multi-Scale Framework of Assessing Fracking
Risk Perception
James A. Pollard1,∗ and David C. Rose1,2
Hydraulic fracturing has provided a persistent, polarizing, and highly politicized source of
controversy internationally and in numerous national contexts for just under a decade. This
research uses hydraulic fracturing (i.e., fracking) operations in New Zealand as a vignette
through which to understand the underlying causes of controversy and the appropriateness
of attempts to address them. A multi-method approach using interviews (n = 25), diagram-
matic analysis, and newsprint media was applied to evidence two major findings. First, pre-
vious attempts to explain fracking controversy based on social constructivist theory lack a
multi-scalar approach to the assessment of factors that influence risk perceptions. It is found
that risk perception surrounding fracking in New Zealand reflects intra-scalar interactions
between factors originating at the international, national, regional, and local scale. Second,
there is a concerning absence of critique pertaining to the concept of “social license to oper-
ate” (SLO), which has been advocated both internationally and nationally as an appropriate
form of stakeholder engagement. This article contributes to the SLO outcomes literature by
establishing a need to consider multi-scalar influences on risk perception when explaining
diverse SLO outcomes in communities where fracking operations are prospective or already
taking place.
KEYWORDS: Hydraulic fracturing; risk perception; social license to operate
1. INTRODUCTION
Guaranteeing secure, sustainable, and afford-
able energy is one of the central challenges faced
by modern societies. As history attests, onshore en-
ergy development often goes hand-in-hand with in-
tense public opposition (Devine-Wright, 2009; Flynn,
2003; Pidgeon &Demski, 2012). Hydraulic fracturing
(henceforth referred to as fracking) has been applied
in the oil and gas industry since 1949 to improve the
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productivity of existing wells and allow the extraction
of unconventional resources such as shale gas (Mont-
gomery & Smith, 2010; The Royal Society & Royal
Academy of Engineering, 2012). It involves pump-
ing “fracking fluid” down a well at high pressure to
fracture source rock. So called “proppants,” typically
spherical sand, in the fluid ensure fractures remain
open after the fluid is removed, allowing gas to flow
from the source rock via a multiple lined well to the
surface.
A contentious, polarizing, and highly public de-
bate has been playing out since 2010 between indus-
try, regulators, scientists, activists, politicians, and the
wider public over the technique popularly termed
“fracking” (Mazur, 2014). Eight years on there re-
mains no consensus as to whether fracking is the
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key to a “golden age of gas,” or a technology com-
pounded by uncertain social and environmental im-
pacts (International Energy Agency, 2011). The lack
of consensus is manifest in an inconsistent array of
policy responses ranging from pro-fracking legisla-
tion (Pennsylvania), to moratoria (the Netherlands,
Quebec, and Scotland) and complete bans (France).
Since fracking is a relatively new arena of en-
ergy controversy on the world stage, the literature on
understanding people’s risk perception towards the
technique is undeveloped as compared to other en-
ergy projects, such as nuclear power. Using a vignette
of fracking in New Zealand, the purpose of this arti-
cle is twofold; first, it argues that a comprehensive
multi-scale approach (considering spatial scales from
local to international) of assessing risk perception
surrounding fracking has been largely missing from
existing studies. This is a significant shortcoming con-
sidering the multi-scale influences on fracking risk
perception.
Second, the article extends existing work on “so-
cial license to operate” (SLO) (Gunningham, Kagan,
& Thornton, 2004) to fracking, a context to which it
has seldom been applied in the literature. Using the
same vignette, the article argues that explicit atten-
tion to public risk perception grants greater sophisti-
cation to existing explanations of SLO outcomes.
2. THE RISKS OF FRACKING: A
CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACH
2.1. Understanding Risk Perception
Although risk has historically been defined in
objectivist terms, scholars have illustrated the com-
plexity of risk perception (Beck, 1992; Slovic, 1987;
Walport & Craig, 2014). The “objectivist,” techni-
cal interpretation puts forward a quantitative defini-
tion of risk as probability multiplied by consequence.
This approach has proven successful in characteriz-
ing risks in well-defined systems where probabilities
and consequences can be easily identified and quanti-
fied; e.g., the chances of engineering failure or trans-
port safety (Stirling, 2007; Wynne, 1992). Yet, an in-
sistence on applying these techniques to increasingly
complex risks has revealed considerable limitations,
with technocratic approaches to risk assessment criti-
cized for creating an unsupportable sense of certainty
(Wynne, 1992); purporting a misconceived separa-
tion of scientific investigation from its social and cul-
tural context (Jasanoff, 1991); and failing to engage
with the political implications of these risk assess-
ments (Owens, 2000).
The unsatisfactory nature of objectivist inter-
pretations has given rise to a collection of alterna-
tive approaches that fall into the broad category of
constructivist theory. Constructivist approaches have
displayed explanatory power in relation to numer-
ous emerging techno-environmental risks, including:
nuclear power (Flynn, 2003), nanotechnology (Ka-
han, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen, 2009), and re-
newable energy (Devine-Wright, 2009). Suggesting
a potential to offer significant insights to the con-
troversy surrounding fracking. A constructivist ap-
proach explains mismatches between risk perception
and quantitative risk assessment by drawing atten-
tion to a variety of less tangible cultural, psychomet-
ric, and place-based factors. Cultural theory suggests
that even if it were possible to determine risk quan-
titatively, the extent to which this risk can be consid-
ered “acceptable” will depend fundamentally on the
value sets, or “worldviews,” of the communities from
which the risk is perceived (Douglas, 1992, 1966). In
this way, worldviews act as “orientating dispositions”
that influence the uptake and interpretation of infor-
mation concerning specific risks (Dake, 1992; Starr,
1969). Alternatively, and paying greater attention to
the individual, psychometric theory provides a ba-
sis for explaining and anticipating public perceptions
of risk, based on qualitative risk characteristics and
emotive associations it acquires (Fischhoff, Slovic,
Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Sandman, 1987;
Slovic, 1987; Starr, 1969).
An area of research with purchase among prac-
titioners is the study of socioeconomic and place-
based factors (Larock & Baxter, 2013). This includes,
though is not limited to, opposition arising in the lo-
cal proximity to development projects, collectively
referred to as NIMBYism (Dear, 1992). It has been
found that proximity alone is insufficient to explain
opposition to local developments (Cotton, 2013; Sev-
erson, 2012). Rather, it is necessary to take into ac-
count ways in which a certain place contributes to
the identity of communities and the specific associ-
ations the community has with the threat in question
(Larock & Baxter, 2013; Perlaviciute & Steg, 2014;
Vorkinn & Riese, 2001).
One attempt to reconcile these influences on
risk perception is the social amplification of risk
framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988). This
is underpinned by the fact that as humans observe
and communicate risk, they introduce subjectivities
(Kasperson et al., 1988). Specific events associated
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with a given risk can be termed “risk events” and
their “risk signal” can be analyzed as it becomes sub-
ject to processes of social amplification and atten-
uation (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & Slovic,
2003). It may even be possible to identify amplifi-
cation or attenuation “stations,” such as institutions,
people, or media sources, that act as sites of risk sig-
nal alteration. Following the amplification and at-
tenuation process, the risk signal may exert ripple
effects, leading to impacts on secondary or tertiary
parties that were previously uninvolved (Kasperson
et al., 2003).
2.2. Fracking Risk Perception—AMulti-Scale
Approach
Fracking can be considered an “emerging tech-
nology” given its recent rapid growth accompanied
by significant uncertainty and ambiguity surround-
ing environmental impacts (Halaweh, 2013; Rotolo,
Hicks, & Martin, 2015). Despite numerous publica-
tions (Moniz, Jacoby, & Meggs, 2011; The Royal So-
ciety & Royal Academy of Engineering, 2012) seek-
ing to quantify the environmental and health risks
associated with fracking, controversy persists at mul-
tiple scales from the local to the international. Few
studies have turned to constructivist theory to ex-
plain the enduring controversy surrounding fracking
operations, though the potential for it to provide the
theoretical basis for analyzing perceptions of frack-
ing has been outlined (Boudet et al., 2014; Clarke
et al., 2015).
Existing literature has demonstrated the impor-
tance of different scalar influences on fracking risk
perception. The individual is the most common scale
of analysis. Research in the United States used a na-
tionally representative survey (n= 1,061) to draw out
key traits that correspond with support or opposi-
tion to fracking (Boudet et al., 2014). By consider-
ing sociodemographics, affective imagery, proximity,
worldviews, political ideology, media use, and famil-
iarity, it is suggested that women, those with egalitar-
ian worldviews, and those who read the newspaper
more than once a week are more likely to oppose.
Drawing on the same data set, a later study sought
to emphasize the importance of community identity
in influencing risk perceptions, alluding to the im-
portance of multi-scalar influences on risk percep-
tion (Boudet, Bugden, Zanocco, & Maibach, 2016).
A further study (Davis & Fisk, 2014) suggested that
preferences regarding fracking regulation relate to
whether people consider fracking as an energy (more
positive) or an environmental (more negative) issue.
A similar methodological approach was applied to
focus explicitly on the role of top-of-mind associa-
tions, suggesting that “fracking” elicits more negative
associations as opposed to “shale oil or gas develop-
ment” (Clarke et al., 2015). By comparison, a study
focusing on engagement with specific documentaries
found that narratives may trigger affective responses
in individuals (Cooper & Nisbet, 2016). Narrative in-
volvement with the Gasland documentary increased
worry, concern, and desire for regulation, while nar-
rative involvement with the FrackNation documen-
tary had a reassuring effect and engendered confi-
dence in existing regulation.
One of the few studies (Graham, Rupp, &
Schenk, 2015) to consider regional and community
scales utilized 66 surveys in the United States to ex-
plore state-dependent differences in risk perception.
When choosing between increased regulation or a
ban, at the national scale, the majority of respondents
favored regulation, while in New York State, the ma-
jority favored a ban. By drawing on multiple surveys,
each situated at specific scale, it is not possible to de-
termine how multi-scalar influences are reflected in
any one person’s or group’s perception. To achieve
this, multi-scalar analysis of a single interview group
is required.
At the national scale, media representations of
fracking have been used to provide comparison be-
tween Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom
(Upham, Lis, Riesch, & Stankiewicz, 2015). Here,
the multi-scalar perspective refers to levels of socio-
technical change, ranging from niche-protected inno-
vations to landscape-scale change. A further study
(Sica, 2015) seeks to explain why fracking proceeded
in Pennsylvania despite widespread opposition and
rejection elsewhere nationally. The paper considers
fracking advertisements, noting that benefits were
convincingly presented at multiple stacked scales (lo-
cal, regional, national), but the costs at each scale
were not comprehensively recognized. While this
study draws on multiple scales to explain national-
level policy differences, it does so only regarding the
communication of cost and benefit, rather thanmulti-
scale influences on risk perception.
At the international scale, and with reference to
bothGasland and the Maconodo oil spill, it has been
demonstrated through news trend analysis in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia that
such signals have the potential to influence percep-
tions beyond the national context in which they were
produced (Mazur, 2014). A social and mass media
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analysis in the United States found that the Gasland
documentary both created a discursive opportunity
for the fracking debate, and influenced the selection
of issues that gained most attention (Vasi, Walker,
Johnson, & Tan, 2015). The influence of these major
news stories at finer scales remains to be determined.
Thus far, few studies provide a comprehensive
consideration of the multi-scalar nature of risk per-
ception in the context of fracking. This is a sig-
nificant omission because by situating analysis at a
single scale, influences outside the scale of interest
are side-lined, and thus the fullest possible appreci-
ation of reasons for opposition to (or indeed sup-
port of) fracking cannot be attained. Extending exist-
ing scholarship, this study addresses risk perception
through a multi-scale analysis of fracking operations
with attention to local, regional, national, and inter-
national context.
2.3. Social License to Operate
While a multi-scale analysis of risk perception
surrounding fracking is important for critical schol-
arship, it is further essential to inform the practical
assessment and management of fracking operations.
Reliance on the objective risk definition has typi-
cally encouraged technocratic risk assessment, which
often fosters a deficit model of stakeholder interac-
tion. This is guided by the reasoning that if stake-
holders can be made to understand the technicali-
ties of a given risk, they will be more accepting of
the implementation of technology associated with it.
This assumes that differences in the assessment of
risk between stakeholder groups can be attributed
to differences in knowledge about the risk in ques-
tion (Eden, 1998). Despite increasing attempts to en-
gage the public, motivated by a desire to avoid public
backlash, there are many instances where an uncon-
vinced public has strongly rejected reassurances from
regulators and industry based on technocratic risk as-
sessments (Kahan et al., 2009; Pidgeon & Demski,
2012; Wynne, 1992).
The need to incorporate a broader range of
stakeholders is encompassed in the concept of “social
license to operate” (SLO), which refers to the idea
that operators must go beyond compliance, making
an effort to engage actively with the communities
in which their operations are based (Gunningham
et al., 2004). The conditions of the social license are
achieved when the operator is judged as “having the
ongoing approval and broad acceptance of society
to conduct its activities” (Prno & Slocombe, 2012:
p. 346). Such a license purportedly grants communi-
ties a more privileged position in the policy-making
process, representing a shift in governing author-
ity towards the impacted communities (Prno & Slo-
combe, 2012).
Although the term itself emerged in the 1990s,
literature commenting on the conceptual and prac-
tical suitability of the SLO concept is more recent
(Boutilier & Thomson, 2011; Owen & Kemp, 2013;
Prno, 2013; Prno & Slocombe, 2014). Research uti-
lizing mining industry case studies has established:
the novel contribution that SLO makes to stake-
holder engagement (Boutilier, 2014); the relation-
ship to sustainable development (Owen & Kemp,
2013); the challenge of implementing and measur-
ing SLO in practice (Boutilier & Thomson, 2011);
and how the managers of extractive industries them-
selves conceive of the concept (Parsons, Lacey, &
Moffat, 2014). This last study found the majority of
16 Australia mining managers interviewed conceived
of SLO as applying only locally. This viewpoint fos-
ters conflictual relationships between companies and
communities, with a suggested way forward being for
company behavior to align with wider cultural val-
ues and to incorporate societal and local concerns
(Parsons et al., 2014).
This recommendation is consistent with studies
that show how SLO outcomes depend on context,
public participation, trust, and culture (Harvey &
Bice, 2014; Moffat & Zhang, 2014; Prno, 2013; Ruck-
stuhl, Thompson-Fawcett, & Rae, 2014). One study
incorporates these influences in a systems-based con-
ceptual framework for assessing the determinants of
SLO outcomes (Prno & Slocombe, 2014). The frame-
work emphasizes the need to engage with local vari-
ables specific to the community and mining project,
alongside socioeconomic conditions, biophysical con-
ditions, and governance/institutional arrangements
that take place at regional, national, and interna-
tional scales. The framework recognizes that local
perceptions are an important influence on SLO out-
comes. It seems likely, therefore, that outcomes may
depend on the perception of risk associated with the
activity in question. In theory, communities can re-
serve their “social license” if they perceive the risks
associated with an activity, whether tangible or intan-
gible, to outweigh the associated benefits.
The lack of critical commentary on SLO in con-
texts beyond mining is concerning. Fracking is an im-
portant context for analysis given the SLO concept is
named as the ultimate goal of the International En-
ergy Agency’s “10 Golden Rules for a Golden Age
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of Gas” (International Energy Agency, 2011). Few
studies assess the application of the SLO approach
to fracking operations. One U.S. study offers guid-
ance on how best to achieve SLO for fracking op-
erations, though focusing explicitly on the need for
best practice in attenuating local impacts on air, wa-
ter, “nuisances,” monitoring, and disclosure (House,
2013). Similarly, a study making recommendations
for an emerging fracking industry in China outlines
local community impacts that must be addressed to
achieve SLO (Hu & Xu, 2013). Both studies assume
that failure to achieve SLO is a result of failure to
address (largely) tangible impacts at the local scale.
Further research is required to establish whether risk
perception is subject to similar scalar interconnectiv-
ity as other factors in Prno and Slocombe’s (2014)
conceptual framework and whether this can con-
tribute to understanding varied SLO outcomes.
3. METHODS
This study uses the case of fracking in New
Zealand as a vignette to illustrate the need for a
multi-scale approach to understand risk perception,
as well as extending the critical literature on “social
license to operate.” Despite the small scale of cur-
rent operations, New Zealand has not escaped the
global controversy surrounding fracking. The tech-
nique was first applied there in 1989, in Taranaki,
on the North Island (Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Environment, 2012). Between 1989 and 2012,
55 wells were fractured, some, multiple times. Most
operations targeted conventional “tight sands” in
Taranaki, though some have taken place in coal seam
gas mines in Southland and Waikato (Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment, 2012; Todd En-
ergy, 2012). Subsequently, energy companies have
been granted exploratory permits for the east coast
of North and South Island where shale resources are
suspected; these areas are reportedly “poised on the
brink of what could be a larger and rapid expansion
of oil and gas production” (Parliamentary Commis-
sioner for the Environment, 2012, p. 29). Even fol-
lowing a 2011 tightening of environmental and health
and safety regulation surrounding fracking opera-
tions in New Zealand, controversy has hardly eased
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment,
2014).
A multi-method approach was adopted, using in-
terviews, diagrammatic analysis, and newsprint me-
dia analysis. To a certain extent, this three-pronged
approach minimized the impact of limitations associ-
ated with any single method in isolation. For exam-
ple, interviews were useful because they captured the
views of, and framings considered by, elite stakehold-
ers in-depth. For certain stakeholders, this may allow
personal views to emerge that may have been left out
of published documents. In a more extreme case, in-
terviewing provides the opportunity to collect opin-
ions from individuals who lack access to newsprint
or diagrammatic communication platforms. It further
allowed multiple views about fracking to be investi-
gated, namely, from stakeholders, the media, and the
policy community. The necessity of the multi-method
approach employed by this study lies in the reality
that applying just one approach provides only a par-
tial account of discussions relating to fracking oper-
ations in New Zealand. Considering this, all three
approaches and the results they generate inform the
discussion in a synergistic manner, rather than cer-
tain methods applying to specific scales of analysis.
3.1. Primary Data
Primary data were collected using semi-
structured interviews. This allowed a focus on
elite stakeholders, which have been identified as
important in framing and shaping controversies
(Plutzer, Maney, & O’Connor, 1998; Sica, 2015).
Consequently, the interviews indicate the concerns
associated with fracking from the perspective of
elite stakeholders, as opposed to “direct” assessment
of public attitudes that questionnaire surveys have
sought to achieve elsewhere (Boudet et al., 2014;
Whitmarsh et al., 2015; Williams, Macnaghten,
Davies, & Curtis, 2015).
A purposive sampling technique was employed,
allowing stakeholders to be targeted. Interviewees
were selected from websites of institutions involved
in conducting, regulating, researching, or opposing
fracking operations in New Zealand. Additional in-
terviewees were identified through snowballing. The
continuous referral to certain individuals indicates
comprehensive coverage of stakeholders across the
spectrum of interest.
Twenty-five semi-structured interviews were
undertaken with 28 participants between 13/08/15
and 16/09/15. Interviews ranged from 25 to 145
minutes and were conducted face-to-face (19/25), via
telephone (3/25), and video link (3/25). Interviewees
were classified into a range of stakeholder types
and regional geographies (supplementary material).
Transcribed interviews were analyzed using a the-
matic hierarchical coding technique (Strauss, 1987)
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with subsequent quantitative analysis (supplemen-
tary material). Each interview was read multiple
times to ensure codes emerged from the data rather
than imposing predetermined codes (Cope, 2010).
That said, given the transcripts were self-generated
artifacts, the themes on which the interview ques-
tions were based did feature during coding (Cope,
2010). Codes were built into themes by reading
across interviews. This was achieved by creating
documents into which similar codes from each
interview were collated and reanalyzed (Bryman,
2012). Limited sample size meant the results of these
quantitative analyses are not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, they do indicate the issues considered
important by those interviewed.
3.2. Secondary Data
3.2.1. Diagrammatic Representations of Fracking
This study compares three diagrams identified
from a preliminary survey of policy documents
and internet resources regarding fracking in New
Zealand. The selected diagrams (Fig. 3) originate
from activist, industry, and expert advisory groups,
respectively. Though three diagrams cannot repre-
sent the full variety of stakeholder types, critical at-
tention towards those presented here provides an
insight to the varied ways in which diagrams may
be employed for risk communication. The approach
to image analysis focused on the site of image pro-
duction and on the image itself, with reference to
Rose’s (2013) three modalities: technological (se-
lecting objects designed to be consumed visually),
compositional (considering content, color, and pre-
sentation of the image), and social (acknowledging
economic, social, and political relations, institutions
and practices that surround an image, and through
which it is seen and used). This formalized approach
helped to minimize the influence of positionality in
the interpretation of the diagrams (Rose, 1997).
3.2.2. Newsprint Media Analysis
A Factiva search was performed on New
Zealand’s three most-read print newspapers for ar-
ticles including the term “fracking” and published
between 01/09/10 and 01/10/15. “Fracking” was cho-
sen as opposed to “hydraulic fracturing” because it
is used specifically to refer to fracking in the con-
text of oil and gas. The Factiva search returned 454
print newspaper articles with mention of the term
Fig. 1. Total number of coded citations of concerns from inter-
views associated with fracking in New Zealand.
“fracking,” which were subjected to an automated
content analysis using Atlas.ti (supplementary mate-
rial). While it is not possible to distinguish whether
articles refer to fracking in New Zealand or in other
national contexts, this media analysis provides an
important insight to the temporal evolution of the
debates.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Fracking Controversy in New Zealand
The controversy surrounding fracking in New
Zealand represents a contest between different
stakeholders seeking to impose their own inter-
pretation of the important issues. The majority of
risks identified during interviews and newsprint me-
dia analysis are social and environmental impacts
of fracking (Figs. 1 and 2). These risks were fre-
quently positioned against economic benefits, set-
ting up a familiar dichotomy observed elsewhere
with regard to fracking (Sica, 2015; Whitmarsh et al.,
2015). Scientific reports, media statements, and polit-
ical remits (local councils are not allowed to consider
climate change during resource consenting) simulta-
neously define the dominant issue as environmental
risk while assuring stakeholders that this risk is man-
ageable, or at least outweighed by economic ben-
efits. The advantages of this derive from the ex-
clusion from regulatory discussions, broader issues
that are more intractable and less easily addressed
through familiar environmental risk assessment
approaches.
The contest between different stakeholders
is also visually evident as demonstrated through
diagrammatic analysis (Fig. 3). This is an important
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Fig. 2. Total number of citations of specific terms in newsprint
articles including the term “fracking” in New Zealand’s three
most-read print papers. “*” Indicates truncated words, e.g. “earth-
quake*” includes counts of both “earthquake” and “earthquakes.”
aspect of risk perception given that opinion forma-
tion is also guided by “top-of-mind” associations re-
garding the affective qualities of risk information
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). On
first inspection, the Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Environment (PCE) diagram (Fig. 3c) appears
neutral; yet a choice has been made in the use of
muted colors and in presenting deep fracturing. An
alternative technique is deployed in the Todd Energy
diagram (Fig. 3b) where a concerted effort has been
made to emphasize the distance between the fractur-
ing and the aquifer layers using the Auckland Sky
Tower to communicate relative distances. Both dia-
grams indicate the small dimensions of fractures in
relation to the overall operation. In this way, Figs. 3b
and 3c intend to depoliticize environmental risks that
have gained significant attention in the fracking de-
bate. By contrast, the image from the Lock the Gate
Aotearoa website (Fig. 3a) emphasizes the threats
posed to groundwater showing fractures extending
into the aquifer layer. There is also a visual rep-
resentation of flammable water sources—an iconic
anti-fracking image. These images reinforce associ-
ations between specific risks and fracking, contribut-
ing to the way fracking is constructed in the cognitive
spaces of stakeholders (Finucane et al., 2000; Rose,
2013; Slovic, 1999). It is against this backdrop of dis-
cursive and visual conflict that we will explore the
multi-scalar influences on risk perception surround-
ing fracking in New Zealand.
4.2. International
High-profile events have the potential to rein-
force or disrupt the risk perceptions of fracking out-
lined thus far. They draw attention to certain aspects
of the debate and obscure others through amplifica-
tion and attenuation effects. This study identifies two
international-scale events that exerted a notable im-
pact on the evolution of debates in New Zealand,
namely, the Gasland documentary and the Macondo
oil spill.
On 15 September 2010, Josh Fox released the
documentary Gasland about fracking in the United
States The documentary was identified as influential
to the New Zealand debate in >95% of the 25 inter-
views. Respondents frequently referred to one scene
in which someone is shown setting their kitchen tap
on fire, providing a convincing illustration of the so-
cial amplification of risk framework (e.g., Fig. 3a).
Continuing with the SARF terminology,Gasland can
be considered a “risk event” with a notable influ-
ence on the “risk signal” (Kasperson et al., 2003)
of fracking. This has multi-scale impacts, with sub-
sequent ripple effects for third parties, e.g., regional
councils who must deal with concerns conceived
though comparisons between the United States and
New Zealand. Furthermore, Gasland’s focus on wa-
ter contamination, as noted elsewhere (Cooper &
Nisbet, 2016; Vasi et al., 2015), appears to resonate
with regionally-specific water-related concerns. This
was evident in both the coded interviews and media
analysis where water contamination dominated cita-
tions, accounting for 21% and 16% of total citations,
respectively (Figs. 1 and 2).
The Macondo oil spill further demonstrates the
potential for international events to shape risk per-
ception at finer spatial scales. Cited in 36% of inter-
views as shaping national debates, the Macondo spill,
much like disasters associated with the nuclear indus-
try, exemplifies the catastrophic potential of oil and
gas extraction (Pidgeon&Demski, 2012; Visschers &
Siegrist, 2013).
there have [been] some very high, tragic catastrophes,
whether it’s North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, with signifi-
cant loss of life and pollution when human error occurs.
And it causes community concern, because when it goes
wrong, it can go wrong in a catastrophic sense. (Expert
Advisory Body)
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Fig. 3. Diagrammatic representations of
fracking in New Zealand publications. (a)
“What is Fracking?” on Lock the Gate
Aotearoa website; (b) Fracking—An in-
troduction to operations in Taranaki,
Todd Energy; (c) The main stages of
cracking rocks so oil and gas can flow
(PCE, 2012).
The attention gained by fracking might then be
interpreted as the result of a two-way relationship
where association with the oil and gas industry inten-
sifies fears about the impacts of fracking, with frack-
ing subsequently providing a focal point for fears
over oil and gas. Although “violations” have been
documented in the conduct of fracking (Moniz et al.,
2011), no globally catastrophic events with direct
links to fracking operations have occurred. Conse-
quently, this study’s finding that in the majority of
instances, catastrophic events were associated with
fracking regardless, is arguably indicative of a shared
reputation across the oil and gas industry (Small
et al., 2014).
Tangible links between fracking and oil and gas
markets can also calm debates, as demonstrated in
Fig. 4, with newsprint media mentions of “fracking”
tailing off towards the end of 2015. One explana-
tion is the plummeting global oil price and associated
decline in the economic feasibility of fracking. This
short-term lapse of attention could, perhaps, provide
an opportunity to incorporate some of the less tan-
gible concerns that stakeholders in the debate have
expressed.
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Fig. 4. Frequency of newsprint articles including the term
“fracking” in New Zealand’s three most-read print papers,
October 2009–October 2015.
4.3. National
Four national influences emerging from data
analysis are elaborated upon. Comparisons with the
geothermal energy and agricultural industries are
used to explain the “lightning rod” metaphor, then
the Christchurch earthquake and the PCE 2012 Re-
port publication are posited as important national
events that shaped risk perceptions.
The “lightning rod” metaphor refers to use of
fracking by certain stakeholders to draw attention to
oil and gas operations as a whole in New Zealand,
as well as underlying concerns surrounding climate
change. These broader issues accounted for 15% and
7%, respectively, of coded citations from interviews
(Fig. 1). The importance of the wider context in
which a given risk is situated has been noted else-
where in relation to emerging technologies. For ex-
ample, the risks of radiation are perceived as greater
in the context of nuclear waste than in medical prac-
tices (Flynn, 2003). This study suggests that a con-
textual influence on risk perception is evident when
fracking in the oil and gas industry is compared to
similar techniques in geothermal power generation.
Several respondents noted that geothermal fractur-
ing in New Zealand has not attracted the widespread
attention associated with fracking. This is likely at-
tributable, in part, to differences between the tech-
niques employed in each industry, as geothermal op-
erations typically occur in areas of greater natural
seismicity, far from populations, and on a smaller
scale compared to oil and gas operations. This study
suggests an additional reason geothermal fracturing
has gained less attention than oil and gas fracking is
stigmatism of the latter industry.
Continuing the discussion of national issues that
underwrite the fracking debate, some respondents
looked beyond the oil and gas industry, positing cli-
mate change as the underlying concern. A second in-
dustry comparison, this time with agriculture, brings
into question the association of climate change with
fracking in New Zealand. Agriculture appears to
enjoy comparatively little stigma, given that it ac-
counted for the greatest percentage of occupational
fatalities (43%) in New Zealand in 2015 (Worksafe,
2015) and contributed the greatest percentage of any
industry to greenhouse gas emissions (48%) in 2013
(New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, 2015).
One respondent sought to provide an explanation for
this:
Interviewer: Does the farming sector get much flack for
climate change issues?
. . . there’s a general perception that farming was a
good . . . years ago perhaps when I was a child . . . farm-
ing was a good thing to do, it’s kind of archetypical New
Zealand, Kiwis like the farming sector and all that. (Lo-
cal Government)
While associations between agriculture and
methane emissions are well documented, the link
between fracking and climate change is contested
(Feng, Davis, Sun, & Hubacek, 2016; Stephenson,
Doukas, & Shaw, 2012). It is possible to identify two
distinct narratives. The first asserts that fracking per-
petuates dependence on fossil fuels by enabling the
exploitation of resources unattainable with conven-
tional drilling techniques. The second is widely re-
ferred to as the “transition fuel argument” and pur-
ports the view that natural gas, accessed through
fracking, provides a stepping stone between dirtier
hydrocarbons and renewables that are not yet com-
mercially viable (Stephenson et al., 2012). This lat-
ter narrative might be described as a legitimizing
discourse (Hajer, 1997), employed to obscure the
climate risk associated with fracking. In the context
of New Zealand, both narratives are, arguably, of
limited relevance given that gas contributes just over
20% to the current energy mix (Gas Industry Com-
pany, 2014). Both narratives are employed regard-
less, perhaps reflecting an awareness of the momen-
tum gained by the global climate change movement
and the potential benefit of aligning fracking with it.
Moving on from industry comparison to na-
tional risk events, the greatest media coverage sur-
rounding fracking corresponds with the Christchurch
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City Council’s decision to place a moratorium on
fracking operations on April 12, 2012, following
earthquakes in September 2010 and February 2011
(Fig. 4). The council’s decision is intriguing for the
reasons articulated by one respondent:
Yep, the Christchurch City Council, having been
through the earthquakes, banned fracking, yeah it was
actually a huge joke because a) nobody was actu-
ally talking about doing any fracking anywhere near
Christchurch or anywhere in the Christchurch area any-
way b) the City Council has no power to ban fracking . . .
(Local Government).
This paints the council’s decision as a political
move, though not unfounded given the widespread
trauma and destruction caused by the earthquakes.
A comparison can be drawn between the interac-
tion of the Christchurch earthquake with fracking
and the Sendai earthquake with nuclear power. The
Fukushima disaster exemplifies a natural disaster col-
liding with a techno-environmental risk in a tangible
sense, through tsunami-induced flooding; whereas
the Christchurch earthquake collided with fracking
only in the intangible discursive space and no frack-
ing wells were compromised. Yet because the earth-
quakes that hit Christchurch entered a context where
fracking practices had been linked to induced seis-
micity in the United States (Moniz et al., 2011), risk
amplification occurred, with ripple effects reaching
the Taranaki region.
Germany was doing it, France was doing it, various
[parts] of the States were doing it, these sort of mora-
toria for a period. And Christchurch City Council has
done it, why hasn’t Taranaki Regional Council banned
it —that was the logic. (Local Government)
Intriguingly, despite national risk amplification,
the Christchurch earthquake had little, if any, influ-
ence on the international fracking debates, unlike
Fukushima, which triggered international policy re-
sponses, such as in Germany.
In contrast to the above example, national events
are not exclusively risk amplifying. This is exempli-
fied by the November 2012 PCE Report publication
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment,
2012). The report, which investigated exclusively the
environmental impacts of fracking, concluded that
a moratorium was not justified given the current
state of scientific evidence. This attenuated concern
because of the credibility associated with the PCE
itself (Hilgartner, 2000). The Commissioner is con-
sidered well trusted by virtually all respondents, pri-
marily deriving from an independent status.
I thought that was a very good piece of work and it’s be-
fitting of one who sits independent of government and
just tries to provide the best advice without political in-
terference. (Expert)
There was aspects of the PCE that I think gave some of
our community stakeholders some piece of mind, that
an independent review had found, had the same conclu-
sion that we do as a company. (Industry)
Even though risk assessments by the Taranaki
Regional Council, Todd Energy, and GNS Science
informed the PCE report, as stand-alone sources,
they lacked the credibility required to achieve
widespread influence. One contributory factor is the
New Zealand regulatory context, which states that
the regional government is responsible for regula-
tion of environmental laws and facilitating economic
activity, presenting a potential conflict of interests.
Furthermore, given that industry was expected to
fulfill a self-regulating role, evidence produced con-
cerning the environmental impacts of fracking ac-
tivities engendered notable skepticism. Where trust
in the source of information is lacking, a focus on
communicating scientific evidence from environmen-
tal risk assessment is often ineffective, given that re-
sults may be dismissed out of hand because of prior
beliefs about the credibility of organizations involved
(Eiser, Stafford, Henneberry, & Catney, 2009; Petts,
2008).
4.4. Local and Regional
Local and regional influences are jointly con-
sidered, with “local” referring to locations within
Taranaki where fracking is taking place and “re-
gional” referring primarily to Hawkes Bay, where
fracking operations are prospective.
Virtually all approaches to risk assessments fo-
cus on the environmental risks and are locally spe-
cific to Taranaki (Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Environment, 2012, 2014; Sherburn & Quinn,
2012; Taranaki Regional Council, 2012; Todd En-
ergy, 2012). Discussions with government regulators
and policymakers revealed a persistent belief in the
need to educate the public by “filling the informa-
tion void” with evidence concerning the environmen-
tal impacts of fracking operations. These discussions
typically converged around the term “well integrity,”
which was frequently deployed to demonstrate the
manageable nature of the identified risks.
If you get your well integrity and hydrogeological in-
tegrity right . . . piece of cake. (Local Government)
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Fig. 5. Coded citations of concerns associated with fracking by re-
gional geography. Figures atop columns indicate total number of
coded citations. Red box indicates regions with >3 interviewees.
This represents a “closing down” (Stirling, 2008)
of policy options—the question becomes not whether
fracking is desirable, but how best to manage its im-
pacts. Environmental risk assessments remain impor-
tant and will play a critical role in assessing the tan-
gible risks that fracking poses. Yet the prospect of
oil and gas industry expansion to Hawkes Bay, fa-
cilitated by fracking, and justified by environmen-
tal risk assessments predicated in the Taranaki con-
text has triggered widespread and enduring concern.
This suggests an inability of nonlocal risk assessment,
and subsequent risk communication focusing on the
concept of “well integrity,” to alleviate stakeholder
concerns.
In material terms, Hawkes Bay draws the ma-
jority of its wealth from high-value horticultural ac-
tivities. This places huge importance on the aquifer
and helps to explain why water contamination ac-
counted for 35% of citations in Hawkes Bay, the
most of any region (Fig. 5). Additionally, in contrast
to Taranaki, where fracking has been implemented
since 1989, activity in Hawkes Bay is only prospec-
tive. In Hawkes Bay, neither communities nor local
councils have experience of the oil and gas industry,
while in Taranaki:
We’ve been dealing with oil since 1860-something in
Taranaki, we know it, it is not an ogre, it is not some-
thing demonic, it’s something you deal with and regu-
late and the industry actually performs incredibly well
in terms of its level of compliance. (Local Government)
Taranaki’s history of oil and gas production is
perceived as a defining characteristic of this area’s
identity to this day. Consequently, a significant pro-
portion of the population is likely to know someone,
or themselves be, employed in this industry. This is
pertinent given in the United States it has been found
that support for fracking is more prevalent in loca-
tions where a significant proportion of the population
is employed in the extractive industry (Boudet et al.,
2016).
While geological differences between regions
can be addressed using existing environmental risk
management techniques, social and cultural differ-
ences cannot (Wynne, 1992). The perceived novelty
of a given technology is an important psychometric
characteristic (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987).
There is ongoing debate as to whether fracking can
be considered a novel technology and this was mir-
rored in the interviews conducted. The consensus ap-
peared to be that novelty was acquired in certain con-
texts, including the prospect of expansion to Hawkes
Bay, and to some extent Canterbury, where there is
no historic precedent of oil and gas.
what the fracking does is it means we can now drill wells
in Gisborne or Canterbury or wherever we couldn’t be-
fore. So people who have never had to deal with an oil
company before or a council who have never had to
understand the risks of an oil well. (Expert Advisory
Body)
In addition to being a regionally novel tech-
nology, fracking activities conflict with the well-
established place-based identity of Hawkes Bay. This
identity revolves around its role as the “fruit bowl”
of New Zealand. The “clean green” image of New
Zealand appears amplified here given the reputation
of the region as the primary producer of fruit and
vegetables for New Zealand.
Arguably the best quality land in terms of the soil that
we’ve got in the country, that’s why it’s the fruit bowl
and it’s got the best quality water so it draws water. The
whole raison d’etre for Hawkes Bay really is that fruit
bowl and this is just madness to put that at risk, frankly
its madness. (Activist)
In this instance, opposition to fracking is pred-
icated not only on concerns about environmental
risks, but also on the possibility that the very identity
of the region will change because of these activities.
The inability of the current approach to build legiti-
macy or trust among a concerned citizenry becomes
a central impediment to the acceptance of emerging
technologies, with the potential to seriously under-
mine relationships between stakeholders.
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4.5. Applying Risk Perception to Understand
SLO Outcomes
The discussion so far has established that the
controversy surrounding fracking in New Zealand
is the result of numerous multi-scalar influences on
risk perception, which have led to conflict between
stakeholders. Yet, it is untrue to say that there
have been no efforts to incorporate a wider array
of voices into risk assessment and management.
The foremost attempt to achieve more democratic
stakeholder engagement is manifest in the pursuit
of a “social license to operate” in Taranaki by
fracking operators. Interviews revealed that while
endorsement was not universal among respondents,
there was reasonable consensus on the type of
engagement required, including: building trust and
credibility; responsible business practice; being a
good neighbor; and fostering active engagement.
These characteristics are in broad agreement with
literature on social license (Prno & Slocombe, 2012).
In practice, there is a bias towards addressing
SLO at the local scale in isolation of multi-scale vari-
ables, that have been identified as importance influ-
ences on SLO outcomes in the mining industry liter-
ature (Parsons et al., 2014; Prno & Slocombe, 2014).
This is exemplified in Taranaki where local impacts
accounted for 23% of citations in the region (Fig.
5). Having identified that social license is unfulfilled,
operators in Taranaki displayed concerted efforts to
address the issues raised. For example, in response
to complaints over trucking, water for use in fractur-
ing operations was pumped onto the site. The oper-
ator’s wider intention is articulated by the following
statement:
what we wanted to do is be just the same as a farmer
or resident and be available 24 hour a day, there was a
big piece around a 0800 number so people can ring the
company, 24 hours a day whenever they are experienc-
ing anything related to our operation. (Industry)
This kind of engagement is necessary, but also
revealing. Applied in its present form, the SLO seeks
to engage citizens only when they are perceived to
be directly impacted by the fracking operations. As
a result, those experiencing tangible local impacts of
fracking in Taranaki have been engaged by opera-
tors since straightforward solutions can be identified,
e.g., limiting trucking and flaring to certain hours. By
contrast, those in Hawkes Bay have not been actively
engaged. This reflects the prospective status of oper-
ations there and lacking recognition of less tangible
psychometric and place-based factors.
The preceding analysis of national-scale factors
suggests a substantive influence on risk perception.
Industry comparisons between fracking, geothermal
energy, and agriculture draw attention to national-
scale policy decisions regarding energy mix climate
change that are already been enshrined in policy. For
obvious economic and political reasons, it is often not
feasible to reopen these broader debates, yet simply
obscuring them by situating engagement at the local
level or dismissing them as out of remit is unlikely
to foster productive relationships between stakehold-
ers. Extending this argument to international focus-
ing events, the need to engage with “risk events” such
asGaslandwas recognized by some stakeholders, but
not others.
Gas Lands is about America so we can’t say well ac-
tually the truth in America was, you know, that is not
our expertise, we know about Taranaki, we’re experts
in Taranaki. (Regulator)
Given that stakeholders involved in the fracking
industry cannot control these events, communicat-
ing the relevance of international influences to na-
tional, regional, and local concerns should be a prior-
ity. When the implementation of SLO does not live
up to the associated rhetoric, it fosters highly skepti-
cal attitudes:
I think it’s [social license] enabling particular types of
behaviours and disabling others. It pays lip service to
some things. (Expert Advisory Body)
This critical judgment suggests the social license
to operate could be invoked by operators to claim
legitimacy of fracturing operations in the absence of
truly inclusionary processes. This has serious implica-
tions regarding the democratic basis of decisions on
fracking in New Zealand.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This study offers two contributions to the un-
derstanding of risk perceptions surrounding fracking
and the implications for risk management outcomes.
First, it considers the determinants of fracking risk
perception using a multi-scalar approach with atten-
tion to the intra-scalar interactions and their shaping
of risk perception. Building on previous studies that
utilize constructivist theory to explain fracking con-
troversy (Boudet et al., 2014; Clarke et al., 2015), it
is argued that the multi-scalar analysis undertaken
here provides a fuller appreciation of the range of
factors, and to some extent their relative impor-
tance in New Zealand. The intra-scalar interaction
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between these factors is clearly demonstrated by the
Gasland documentary, an international “risk event”
whose focus on water contamination resonates with
regional concerns regarding aquifer contamination
in Hawkes Bay, and that triggered the need for lo-
cal engagement from fracking operators and regu-
lators in Taranaki. Gasland’s influence on debates
at finer scale reflects a failure of stakeholders to ac-
knowledge the relevance of international influencing
factors and engage proactively with concerns ema-
nating from them. National industry comparisons re-
veal that fracking acts as a lightning rod, drawing
attention to national policy surrounding the oil and
gas industry and climate change. Favorable recep-
tion of publications from the PCE, derived from its
perceived independence and credibility, perhaps sug-
gests that this is the most appropriate institution for
engaging with these national issues.
Second, this study applies a multi-scalar under-
standing of risk perception to compose a critique of
the SLO concept as applied to fracking. In both min-
ing and fracking, there is evidence that certain stake-
holders consider SLO to apply locally without con-
sideration of alternative scales (Parsons et al., 2014).
This is demonstrated by the inability of SLO to ad-
dress less tangible concerns triggered by prospective
fracking in Hawkes Bay. Locally specific environ-
mental risk assessments appear to lack the perceived
generality that is required if they are to be success-
ful in attenuating regional concerns. The conceptual
framework developed by Prno and Slocombe (2014)
provides a basis for comprehensive multi-scalar anal-
ysis of SLO outcomes, yet only mentions the rele-
vance of “perception” in passing. The results of this
study suggest that communities reserve their “social
license” if they perceive the risks associated with an
activity to outweigh the associated benefits. Incorpo-
rating the multi-scalar influences on risk perception
is, therefore, an essential addition to this framework.
The emerging nature of hydraulic fracturing and
attempts to manage it give rise to numerous avenues
for future research. This study has found that re-
gional and national-scale influences are especially
important in determining risk perceptions in the
New Zealand context, yet it is unknown whether
this is typical elsewhere in the world. Clarifica-
tion here could reveal whether engagement at these
levels ought to be prioritized before intervening
locally. Moving on to international influences, this ar-
ticle agrees with previous work into the global na-
ture of media events such as Gasland (Mazur, 2014;
Vasi et al., 2015), but it is unknown whether this is
an Anglophone phenomena or a truly international
influence. Finally, it is interesting to note that the
Christchurch earthquake did not have an interna-
tional risk amplifying effect despite the high-profile
nature of the disaster. It would be interesting to in-
vestigate the reasons for this “failed amplification.”
Notwithstanding the contribution of this study,
it is necessary to recognize some limitations. Al-
though the constructivist lens provides a convincing
explanation for controversy, in practice, it is diffi-
cult to incorporate an appreciation of these factors
in a consistent manner. More research (ideally in col-
laboration with practitioners) is required to provide
implementable guidance that encapsulates the in-
sights offered here and in frameworks such as that
of Prno and Slocombe (2014). Such insights must be
considered alongside environmental risk assessments
and economic appraisals in recognition that these ap-
proaches also make valuable contributions to the un-
derstanding of risk.
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